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The public, automakers, and policymakers have long
worried about trade-offs between increased fuel econo-
my in motor vehicles and reduced safety. The conclusion
of a broad group of experts on safety and fuel economy
in the auto sector is that no trade-off is required. There
are a wide variety of technologies and approaches avail-
able to advance vehicle fuel economy that have no effect
on vehicle safety. Conversely, there are many technolo-
gies and approaches available to advance vehicle safety
that are not detrimental to vehicle fuel economy. 
Congress is considering new policies to increase the
fuel economy of new automobiles in order to reduce
oil dependence and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The findings reported here offer reassurance on an
important dimension of that work: It is possible to sig-
nificantly increase the fuel economy of motor vehicles
without compromising their safety.
Automobiles on the road today demonstrate that high-
er fuel economy and greater safety can co-exist. Some
of the safest vehicles have higher fuel economy, while
some of the least safe vehicles driven today — heavy,
large trucks and SUVs — have the lowest fuel economy
(see graph).
At an October 3, 2006 workshop, leading researchers
from national laboratories, academia, auto manufactur-
ers, insurance research industry, consumer and envi-
ronmental groups, material supply industries, and the
federal government agreed that vehicles could be
designed to simultaneously improve safety and fuel
economy. The real question is not whether we can real-
ize this goal, but the best path to get there.
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Safety Risks of Vehicles with High and Low Fuel Economy**
Source: Wenzel and Ross 2006
* Hybrid model available
** Combined risk includes the risks to own driver and to other drivers
Note: All green cross hatch bars (////) represent fuel efficient vehicle models;   All red cross hatch bars (\\\\) represent inefficient
vehicle models.
C
o
m
b
in
e
d
R
is
k
Risk-to-others
Risk-to-drivers
250
200
150
100
50
0
Le
xu
s
R
X3
00
*
H
on
da
C
R
V
Fo
rd
Es
ca
pe
*
H
on
da
C
iv
ic
*
C
he
vy
Su
bu
rb
an
H
yu
nd
ai
El
an
tr
a
Fo
rd
Fo
cu
s
C
he
vy
Ta
ho
e
Fo
rd
Ex
pl
or
er
C
he
vy
Tr
ai
lb
la
ze
r
D
od
ge
D
ak
ot
a
D
od
ge
R
am
15
00
Fo
rd
F-
15
0
Fo
rd
R
an
ge
r
Executive Summary
The experts’ studies reveal important new conclusions
about fuel economy and safety, including:
• Vehicle fuel economy can be increased without
affecting safety, and vice versa.
• Reducing the weight and height of the heaviest
SUVs and pickup trucks will simultaneously
increase both their fuel economy and overall
safety.
• Advanced materials can decouple size from
mass, creating important new possibilities for
increasing both fuel economy and safety with-
out compromising functionality.
Building Higher-Fuel-Economy,
Safer Vehicles
The key to delivering both safety and fuel economy lies
in vehicle design. Poor design decisions and bad tech-
nology choices undermine vehicle safety as well as fuel
economy. The main factors influencing vehicle safety
include crashworthiness, crash avoidance, and built-in
aggressivity. Crashworthiness considers the ability of a
vehicle to protect its occupants in the event of a crash.
Crash avoidance is the ability of a vehicle, through
manual and automated handling and braking, to avoid
a serious crash altogether. Aggressivity is determined
by designs that make a vehicle incompatible and more
dangerous to others it comes into contact with. 
Technologies exist today that can improve light-duty
vehicle fuel economy by up to 50 percent over the next
10 years without reducing the size of vehicles. With
gasoline prices in the vicinity of $3.00 per gallon, fuel
savings alone would pay for these improvements. If
these technologies were carefully applied, in accor-
dance with safety and environmental standards, fuel
economy could be increased dramatically with no
impact on safety. In addition, there are technologies
available to improve vehicle safety that would have lit-
tle or no effect on fuel economy (see examples in table).
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Some Technology Options for Increasing Fuel Economy and/or Safety
Sources: UCS 2006; NRC 2002; German 2006; Authors’ estimations. “+” represent degrees of gain for each technology,
+++ with the greatest gains. * The additional weight of safety technologies is small and only affects fuel economy on the
margin.
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Many experts at the workshop agreed that strategic
weight reduction (that is, using new lightweight
materials to reduce weight while holding vehicle size
constant and reducing the weight of the heaviest
trucks and SUVs to make them less aggressive) could
be achieved while maintaining, or even improving,
safety. Although some workshop participants dis-
agreed with this conclusion, all participants did agree
that there is ample opportunity to improve fuel econo-
my without reducing vehicle crashworthiness and
occupant safety. Automakers have not consistently
optimized their vehicle designs, and there are many
design and behavioral variables that can affect safety.
Nevertheless, some automakers—VW and Honda, for
example—are designing their lighter vehicles to be as
safe as heavier vehicles and with higher fuel economy.
Several manufacturers with strong safety records, espe-
cially for the European market, are producing a fleet of
lightweight, safe, high-fuel-economy cars.
Henry Ford himself likely would have agreed that low
vehicle mass is not inherently detrimental to safety. He
claimed in his 1922 memoir that he would have made
his Model T lighter if he had only known how.
Introduction: Slow Progress on
Vehicle Fuel Economy and Safety
Henry Ford felt, when it came to automobiles, strong
and light took the prize. Ford stressed, “For some
clumsy reason we have come to confuse strength with
weight. Weight may be desirable in a steamroller, but
nowhere else. The old ox-cart weighed a ton—and it
had so much weight that it was weak! The most beau-
tiful things in the world are those from which all excess
weight has been eliminated. The car that I designed
was lighter than any car that had yet been made. It
would have been lighter if I had known how to make
it so” (Ford 1922).
The Model T weighed in at 1,200 pounds and was said
to cover an estimated 20 miles on a gallon of gasoline.
Henry Ford probably could not have envisioned that
vehicles with curb weights of 3 tons, such as the F-350
pickup, would routinely roll off his assembly lines in
2007. Many of these trucks are so heavy that they have
been exempt from having their fuel economy measured
and reported, but they likely travel less on a gallon of
gasoline that the century-older Model T.1 In spite of
their excessive weight, the largest SUVs and trucks are
some of the least safe autos on the road today.
Automobiles have changed over the years—at least
somewhat. In 1975, a typical American passenger car
drove 13.5 miles per gallon, weighed 4,058 pounds,
had a 136-horsepower engine, and featured an interior
volume of 110 cubic feet. Cars were the norm, with
light trucks comprising fewer than one in five light-
duty vehicles sold—predominantly for agriculture,
delivery, and other business purposes. The typical light
truck got 11.6 miles per gallon, weighed 4,072 pounds,
and had a 142-horsepower engine (Heavenrich 2006).
Thirty years later, the average 2006 model year light-
duty passenger vehicle weighs in at 4,142 pounds—
only 2 percent more than 1975. And the average vehi-
cle fuel economy is now 21 miles per gallon, 60 percent
higher than 1975. This increase has been achieved
despite the fact that light trucks now claim 50 percent
of the new light-duty vehicle fleet, and passenger car
horsepower increased 46 percent, while light truck
horsepower was up 68 percent (Heavenrich 2006).
Automakers have succeeded in increasing vehicle fuel
economy and safety. Fatality rates (deaths per capita)
from auto accidents have fallen over the past four
decades by 43 percent, while injury rates have dropped
on the order of 35 percent (NHTSA 2006). And even
as new vehicles became more and more powerful,
equipped with accessories that consumed increasing
amounts of fuel, the average new vehicle fleet-wide
fuel economy stood steady at 21 miles per gallon.
In reality, unfortunately, less progress has been made
than appears to be the case. The entire 60 percent rise
in new vehicle fuel economy took place immediately
after Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) stan-
dards were implemented. Since 1982 the fuel economy
of new autos has not essentially changed (Heavenrich
2006). The driver fatality rate per million vehicles for
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1 Current CAFE standards exempt vehicles over 8,500 pounds GVWR (gross vehicle weight rating, or total carrying capacity); many
of today’s trucks and SUVs are not regulated in terms of their fuel economy.
new, one- to three-year-old vehicles increased shortly
after CAFE standards were adopted, but has since
declined by more than 50 percent (see figure above).
Despite this progress in new vehicle safety in the U.S.,
the European Union, Canada, and Japan have seen
even more dramatic reductions in fatality rates (see 
figure below). Fewer light-duty trucks, more stringent
seatbelt and drunk driving laws, tighter driver licens-
ing requirements, and accelerated use of new safety
technologies in other countries might help explain why
fatality rates have decreased more rapidly in other
developed nations. 
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U.S. New Light-Duty Vehicle Rated Fuel Economy 
and On-Road Driver Fatality Rate (per million vehicles)
International Motor Vehicle Fatality Rates*, per million vehicles and total
The Potential for Improved Fuel
Economy and Safety
Improved fuel economy and safety are available in
select models. The fuel economies of the “best in their
class” are on the order of 15–20 percent higher than the
“worst in class.” For example, a similarly sized and
equipped Hyundai Elantra (28 combined mpg) con-
sumes 18 percent less fuel than the Mazda 6 (23 mpg).
For any given model, more-powerful, automatic ver-
sions have on the order of 20 percent greater fuel con-
sumption than their less-powerful, manual configura-
tions—VW Passat delivers 24 mpg for a manual, 4-
cylinder, 2-liter engine versus 19 mpg for an automatic,
6-cylinder, 3.6-liter engine. Hybrid models deliver vary-
ing improvements in fuel savings, depending on the
type of hybridization and the specific design decisions
affecting the allocation among fuel economy, weight,
power, and performance. Compare today’s hybrids to
their conventional counterparts: the Ford Escape (19
mpg) versus the Ford Escape Hybrid (30 mpg), a 37
percent fuel savings; Honda Civic DX (29 mpg) to the
Civic Hybrid (42 mpg), a 31 percent fuel savings; and
the Toyota Matrix (27 mpg) to the Toyota Prius (46
mpg), a 41 percent fuel savings2 (US EPA 2007).
Many technologies are available for even further fuel
economy improvement—gasoline direct injection
engines with lean burn and turbocharging, variable
valve timing and lift control, engine idle off, cylinder
deactivation, camless valve activation, electric power
steering, electric water pumps, lightweight construc-
tion, improved aerodynamic design, lower-rolling-
resistance tires, and a growing number of other engine
technology and transmission improvements. The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) reported in 2002
that it was feasible for automakers to bring their
national fleet-wide average fuel economy up to at least
37.1 miles per gallon (NRC 2002). Other researchers
claim higher potential gains—to nearly 42 miles per
gallon fleet-wide (UCS 2006). 
The stunning potential for enhanced vehicle safety is no
different. Many safety technologies and lightweight
materials are available—electronic stability control,
stronger roofs, pillars to improve crashworthiness, com-
patible car and truck front-end heights, side curtain
airbags, strong lightweight materials, and improved
seatbelts are some of the most promising technologies.
In addition, more stringent seat belt and drunk driving
laws and their enforcement, and tighter driver licensing
requirements, have already led to significant declines in
on-road fatalities, and more can be done.
This report is informed by a workshop for automotive
analysts on how fuel economy can be advanced with-
out sacrificing vehicle safety. The analysts’ overarching
conclusion is that no trade-off is required between
vehicle safety and fuel economy; these important goals
can be optimized simultaneously.
In this document we describe the benefits of improv-
ing vehicle fuel economy and safety; clarify some of the
common misunderstandings about the complex rela-
tionship between fuel economy and safety; introduce
the design concepts and technologies that exist today
to build safer and higher-fuel-economy autos; discuss
the newest research from the workshop that informs
this report; identify a few of the challenges and barri-
ers that safer, higher-fuel-economy vehicles face; and
conclude with opportunities for moving forward.
Why Vehicle Fuel Economy and
Safety Improvements Matter
It is becoming increasingly important to package fuel
economy and safety together in the vehicles we drive.
There are many reasons for this. Improved vehicle fuel
economy and safety address many problems at once—
climate change, air pollution, oil dependence, oil
imports, national security, trade deficits, and the inci-
dence and severity of traffic injuries and fatalities are
directly influenced by the vehicles that manufacturers
design and consumers purchase.
Climate Change and Air Pollution
The increase in global temperatures that has long been
predicted to alter the climate has already begun to
affect many of Earth’s life systems. Warming over the
20th century has led to shrinking glaciers, thawing per-
mafrost, shifts in plant and animal habitats, and the
proliferation of insects (IPCC 2001). The U.S. has
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2 EPA recently revised the methods for estimating vehicle fuel economy to better represent current driving styles and conditions. The
new methods apply to model year 2008 and later vehicles; see www.fueleconomy.gov for more details.
done little to rein in the irreversible damage that is being
done—especially when it comes to U.S.-made automo-
biles. The link between autos and climate change is a
direct one. Every gallon of gasoline burned releases
approximately 20 pounds of carbon dioxide. The U.S.
emits more carbon dioxide (the principal greenhouse
gas) than Japan, Canada, Australia, and all of Western
Europe combined (EIA 2006). Even on a per-capita
basis, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions are more than dou-
ble those in Japan and Western European nations and
greater than Canada and Australia.
Diesel fuel has long presented a confounding concern
when it comes to delivering greater fuel economy while
protecting public health. Diesel engines are inherently
more fuel-efficient than those running on gasoline. Yet
the South Coast Air Quality Management District
found diesel exhaust to be carcinogenic in a landmark
study (SCAQMD 2000). New, cleaner ultra-low-sulfur
diesel is now on the market. Cleaner diesel fuels
should produce lower particulate emissions as well as
allow the use of improved exhaust treatment devices to
further reduce air pollutant emissions. Cleaner diesel
may make it more viable to use a diesel fuel strategy to
bring about fuel economy improvements in the future.
Oil Dependence and Economic Disruption
While our entire economy depends to a certain extent
on oil, transportation is the sector most affected.
Gasoline used by motor vehicles accounts for 70 per-
cent of all U.S. oil consumption (EIA 2007a).
Oil prices have fluctuated dramatically over the past
35 years (see figure above). These price swings are dis-
ruptive, and they make it very difficult for consumers
to make rational vehicle purchase decisions. Private oil
companies have little control over market prices.
OPEC has more influence on prices through their
long-run decisions about production capacity and
their short-run decisions about production quotas.
There are also uncontrollable factors influencing oil
supply and demand, from aging refineries to increasing
fuel use by China and elsewhere to debilitating hurri-
canes. A terrorist attack on Saudi oil infrastructure
could send a barrel of crude past $100; a financial-mar-
ket crash could push it below $10. Perhaps the only
guarantee is that the price of oil is unlikely to remain
stable in the future, making it difficult for the market
to meet fuel economy goals without guidance from
public policy.
Oil Imports, National Security, and Trade
Deficits
The world’s petroleum markets, once under the con-
trol of private corporations in the U.S. and Europe, are
now owned and run by new corporate structures.
Through the 1960s, private, Western corporations had
access to 85 percent of the world’s oil reserves. Today,
most of the world’s oil and gas is restricted or entirely
cordoned off from the West. Instead, oil nations con-
trol over two-thirds of the world’s oil. (EIA 2007 b).
Oil imports supply 60 percent of U.S. demands—with
nearly one-half of these imports from OPEC nations.
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National security is, in part, influenced by oil flows. And
these are increasingly influenced by political conditions.
Not only is the U.S. dependent on these oil-rich
nations, trillions of American dollars are handed over
each decade to totalitarian regimes in exchange for
petroleum. A U.S. trade deficit on the order of $300
billion a year is due to oil imports (Jackson 2006).
Moreover, as much as an estimated $60 billion a year is
spent on military defense of oil supplies in the Middle
East (Davis 2006). These sums are expected to rise. 
Injury and Fatality
Accidents, injuries, and fatalities are still numerous
despite technological advances, regulation, and public
outreach. Over 43,000 people are killed and 2.7 mil-
lion are injured a year on roads and in motor vehicles
(NHTSA 2006). Beyond the pain and suffering caused
by traffic accidents, this is a costly situation. Medical
expenses, lost wages, sick leave, insurance outlays, and
a host of other costs can follow a serious injury or
death. Not only do we have to make vehicles safer for
their own occupants, we must make vehicles more
compatible with one another to address safety con-
cerns for all vehicles traveling on the road.   
Safety and Fuel Economy: 
New Realities
The inherent relationship between vehicle safety and
fuel economy has long been the subject of discussion.
The many technologies available to improve vehicle fuel
economy (particularly those that do not involve weight
reduction) have no impact on vehicle safety. Those
approaches that strategically reduce vehicle weight
(using new lightweight materials to reduce weight while
holding vehicle size constant and reducing the weight of
the heaviest trucks and SUVs to make them less aggres-
sive) also improve fuel economy while maintaining, and
perhaps even improving, vehicle safety. 
Poor vehicle design decisions, including those that
involve badly-executed weight reduction, could com-
promise safety. However, such a strategy is not required
to meet fuel economy goals. Still researchers debate the
safety versus vehicle weight issue. We present the
research here because it is part of the debate, not
because it necessary to realizing fuel economy gains.
The potential to improve the fuel economy of light-
duty vehicles while also improving traffic safety is
debated because of the claim that lighter vehicles are,
and will forever remain, more dangerous for their
occupants. The critical issue is whether these historical
tendencies are intrinsic, or whether they continue to
change over time with new designs, testing, and sound
regulations. The reality is that these relationships are
not intrinsic to motor vehicles. Rather, the linkages
among fuel economy, vehicle size, weight, and safety
are manageable and are more a function of smart vehi-
cle design than any other single factor (Wenzel and
Ross 2006).
Two National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) studies examined the effects of hypothetical
changes in vehicle weight upon fatalities (Kahane
1997, 2003). These studies did not distinguish between
weight and size, claiming heavier vehicles are intrinsi-
cally safer than light vehicles. They also did not ade-
quately control for the likely correlation between
unobserved driver attributes (inattentiveness and
aggressiveness) and vehicle attributes. A statistical
analysis of the correlation between fuel economy and
traffic fatalities covering the period from 1966 to 2002
have either produced inconclusive results using state-
level data (Noland 2004), or have conclusively demon-
strated that there was no such correlation at the
national level (Ahmad and Greene 2005).
A more recent study by Dynamic Research, Inc. (DRI),
which isolates changes in vehicle size from changes in
vehicle weight, found that when vehicle size is held
constant, increases in weight increase fatalities, contra-
dicting the Kahane studies’ conclusions (Van Auken
and Zellner 2005a). The DRI study (sponsored by
Honda) further indicates that vehicles would be safer
if they were made lighter but retained their overall
dimensions. A more recent study by Wenzel and Ross
(2006) found that on-road safety varies substantially,
even for models of similar size and weight, suggesting
that vehicle design plays a large role in safety. 
Kahane later acknowledged that his 2003 study “did
not claim that mass per se is the specific factor that
increases or decreases fatality risk”; rather, “in this
type of analysis, ‘vehicle mass’ incorporates not only
the effects of mass per se but also the effects of many
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other size attributes that are historically…related to
mass, such as wheelbase, track width and structural
integrity.” Changes in the relationship between vehicle
weight and size, such as using new, stronger materials to
reduce weight while maintaining size, or “increased use
of advanced restraint systems or sophisticated crash
avoidance safety devices, could have a noticeable impact
on the historical relationship between vehicle mass and
fatality risk in future vehicle fleets” (Kahane 2004).
The DRI and Wenzel and Ross results on the different
effects of weight and size on safety are also consistent
with results reported by O’Neill, Evans, Kebschull,
and many others. O’Neill, Joksch, and Haddon report-
ed in 1974 that increases in vehicle size were “primari-
ly protective,” whereas increases in vehicle weight was
“primarily hostile” (O’Neill, Joksch, and Haddon
1974). O’Neill later added that “cars with added crush
distance can provide increased protection not only to
their occupants but to the occupants of other vehicles
with which they may collide. Weight, on the other
hand, protects some occupants but often at the
expense of others” (O’Neill 1998). Evans reported
empirical equations for fatality risk in two-vehicle,
head-on collisions that indicate that weight reduction
tends to have a self-canceling effect on the total driver
fatality risk (Evans 2001, 2004). But reducing the
length of either car increases the total risk to both driv-
ers (Van Auken and Zellner 2005). Kebschull et al
(2004) reported results based on computer crash sim-
ulations of three SUV designs (a base-
line SUV, reduced-weight SUV, and
increased-length SUV) in a nationally
representative sample of real-world
accidents. The computer simulation
results indicated that the reduced-
weight SUV and the increased-length
SUV both had improved overall safety
compared to the baseline vehicle. 
There are excellent reasons to believe
that the relationship between safety and
fuel economy in any give vehicle model
can be positive and mutually enforcing.
Here are recent research findings:
Increasing vehicle weight is not inher-
ent to safety. Vehicle size, specifically
crush space, does provide safety in cer-
tain types of crashes. The benefits of size have been
confused with vehicle weight, because these two attrib-
utes are correlated across the vehicle fleet in any given
year.  And certain measures of size, such as bumper
height and center of gravity, are detrimental to safety:
high bumpers contribute to the aggressivity of trucks
in crashes with cars, and a high center of gravity
increases the propensity of SUVs and pickups to roll
over.  However, breakthroughs in materials and other
technologies mean that historical correlations between
weight and size, and thus safety, will not necessarily
continue in the future. 
These findings are supported by evidence that we now
have in hand on vehicle fuel economy and safety.
Reality #1: Fuel economy standards have not
stopped Americans from buying large autos.
Data reveal what a glimpse down any street in America
shows—the size of the auto fleet has not uniformly
shifted downward under CAFE standards. Instead, the
upsizing of the vehicle fleet occurred at the same time
that vehicle fuel economy increased significantly across
the board. 
Comparing model year 2005 with 1975 (prior to imple-
mentation of CAFE standards), it is clear overall that
new vehicles got larger, not smaller (see figure;
Heavenrich 2006).  Today four of five new autos sold
are midsize and large vehicles.
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Auto Size Shifts Over Time, 1975 to 2003
Heavenrich, 2006 
Note: Car size based on interior volume; truck size based on wheelbase.
Reality #2: Lightweight, fuel-efficient 
vehicles can be built for safety.
Poor vehicle design decisions cause unsafe autos to be
built. A variety of technological options for increasing
the energy efficiency of engines, transmissions, and
accessories and reducing aerodynamic drag and rolling
resistance are available that are unrelated to vehicle
size or weight (NRC 2002). Technology rather than
size or weight has been the predominant factor in past
fuel economy improvements (Greene 2006).
Looking to the future, vehicle weight reduction in all
vehicles offers opportunities for significant fleet-wide
fuel economy improvements. But this will not cause
unsafe autos to be built. The simple laws of collisions
imply that velocity changes in a crash are dependent
on relative, not absolute, mass, and they provide no a
priori reason to think that making all vehicles lighter
would have either a good or bad effect. Thus, if all
vehicles’ weights were reduced by an equal percentage,
there would be no effect on safety. The key intuitive
argument linking fuel economy to vehicle weight to
safety is actually not applicable to a fleet-wide reduc-
tion in weight (Greene 2006).
The greater the differences in vehicle masses, the worse
the overall safety impacts. Not only are the heaviest,
largest SUVs and pickups more aggressive toward
other vehicles, they also have their own safety problems
regarding rolling over and compromised crash avoid-
ance capabilities. Wenzel and Ross (2006) suggest that
it is useful to consider combined risks that include both
the risk-to-driver and the risk-to-others (who share the
road) when assessing overall vehicle safety.
The safest subcompact car models have a similar com-
bined risk as larger and heavier midsize and large cars
(see figure). The average SUV has a similar combined
risk as the average compact car. Combined risk
increases as pickup truck size increases. This counters
the assertions that the largest, heaviest vehicles are
inherently safer than smaller, lighter models, and that
higher fuel economy translates into lower safety.
Today most of the vehicles with lower
safety risks are Asian and German mod-
els, and those with higher safety risks are
U.S. models. For example, the safest
subcompact car models with the lowest
risk to their own drivers are the VW
Jetta (54), VW Beetle (67), Hyundai
Elantra (86), and Honda Civic (88),
while those with the highest risk are the
Dodge Neon (179), Chevy Cavalier
(168), Pontiac Sunfire (154), and Ford
Escort (152)  (Wenzel and Ross 2006). 
Similarly, the safest SUV models with the
lowest risks to their own drivers are
Asian models—Lexus RX300/330 (24)
and Honda CR-V (40), while those with
the highest risk are U.S. models, includ-
ing the Chevy Blazer (125), GM
Jimmy/Envoy (110), Ford Explorer (96),
and Chevy Tahoe (93) (Wenzel and Ross
2006). The safety differences between
manufacturers are due, in part, to manu-
facturing decisions on their individual
designs and the safety technologies
incorporated into specific models.
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Combined Safety Risks*, by Vehicle Type
Source: Wenzel and Ross 2006  
*Differences of less than 10 percent between vehicle types are not statistically 
significant.
Reality #3: Some SUVs and pickups pose 
safety risks for their drivers and others on 
the road.
Most Americans—55 percent of those surveyed in a
recent TIME/CNN poll—believe SUVs are safer than
cars because of their sheer size (Cloud 2003). But the
perception of safety is not, in reality, safety. The truth
is that the correlation between specific vehicle models
and their fuel economy and safety is influenced greatly
by design and driver behavior. Heavier SUVs and light
trucks do not guarantee passenger safety. Witness
SUVs’ propensity to roll over and heavy pickup trucks’
long stopping distance and inability to maneuver to
avoid a crash. NHTSA’s previous administrator, Jeffrey
W. Runge, M.D., a former emergency-room doctor,
stated that he wouldn’t let his children drive any SUV
with a high propensity to roll over, even “if it was the
last one on Earth.” Runge (2003) continued that con-
sumers may sit in a vehicle and feel safe, “but gut
instinct…isn’t very good for buying a safe automo-
bile.” Moreover, SUV and light-truck aggressivity
toward other vehicles makes them a risk to other driv-
ers due to their incompatible design with other autos.
Some of the least safe vehicles on the road today— in
terms of both safety to their own occupants and to
other vehicles on the road—are the largest SUVs and
trucks (see graph).
Reality #4: Fuel economy improvements have
not occurred through market forces.
In the three decades since the first U.S. oil crisis in
1973, consumers have rarely signaled their desire for
higher fuel economy. The reality is that it takes
upwards of a 15-year cycle for automakers to make and
consumers to purchase an entirely new auto fleet
(Greene 2006). Moreover, consumers have been found
to value only the first three years of fuel savings, not
the 14-year paybacks assumed in models (Greene
2004). These conditions have made it difficult for the
market, unaided by public policies, to deliver an opti-
mal level of fuel economy over time.
For the 2006 model year, less than 1 percent of all vehi-
cles available for purchase achieved over 40 mpg; 3
percent were above average in mileage (30–39 mpg);
57 percent of the vehicles available scored an average
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Source: Wenzel and Ross 2006.
Note: Differences of less than 20 percent between models not statistically significant.
fuel economy (20–29 mpg); and 40 percent were under 
20 mpg (US EPA and US DOE 2007; CAS 2006).
When record-high gasoline prices appeared at U.S.
pumps in summer 2006, market forces could not
instantaneously deliver a fuel-efficient product line-up. 
Automakers at times have considered voluntary action
to increase fuel economy. But market-driven improve-
ments are slow. Enhanced power and performance
have typically taken precedence over gasoline savings
(see figure; Greene 2006). 
Concepts and Technologies
Underpinning Safety and 
Fuel Economy
The principal factors influencing vehicle fuel economy
are relatively straightforward—the energy efficiency of
the overall vehicle balanced against its demand for
power. Driver behavior and the driving environment
also influence fuel economy, but to a lesser degree. 
The elements underpinning vehicle safety are more
complex. The most important factors3 that influence
safety are: drivers, the driving environment, and vehicle
design, including crash avoidance, crashworthiness,
and specific safety features. Drowsiness, inexperience,
aggressiveness, alcohol, and distractions are
some of the underlying factors that account for
driving errors causing accidents. Poor weather,
poorly designed roads, high speed limits, and
stop-and-go traffic are examples of driving con-
ditions that can lead to accidents.
Crash avoidance is the ability of a vehicle,
through driver-controlled and automated han-
dling and braking, to avoid a serious crash alto-
gether. New electronic stability control (ESC)
systems, which selectively apply the brakes at
individual wheels, keep the vehicle from under-
steering or oversteering. ESC systems also cut
power from the engine to help slow the vehicle.
These measures help the driver maintain control
of the vehicle and keep it on the road. NHTSA
has proposed requiring ESC on all new light
motor vehicles, which shows great promise in
reducing serious injuries and fatalities. 
Crashworthiness refers to the ability of a vehicle to pro-
tect its occupants once a crash has occurred.
Standardized laboratory crash tests are used to simu-
late prescribed frontal and side crashes and rollovers.
Engineers strive to minimize occupant deceleration,
through vehicle weight and size (to absorb energy),
and to protect occupants by designing a strong and
rigid compartment (to prevent intrusion) that never-
theless tends to cushion those in other vehicles. 
Crash compatibility is determined by the effect one
vehicle’s design and engineering has on others it comes
into contact with in a crash. Crash compatibility is
affected by the geometry of protective structures, rela-
tive vehicle and occupant compartment stiffness (stiffer
vehicles and compartments provide greater protection,
but can intrude more if the crashing vehicles’ geome-
tries do not match), and relative vehicle weights (heav-
ier vehicles have lower crash energy absorption than
lighter vehicles). Aggressivity is determined by designs
that make a vehicle incompatible with and more dan-
gerous to others it comes into contact with.
Vehicle designs can be optimized to improve safety
and fuel economy performance. Many options are
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Source: Greene 2006.
3 Researchers do not know the rank of the factors affecting vehicle safety; these are not listed in any particular order.
available to increase fuel economy without compro-
mising vehicle safety. Likewise, there are many avenues
available to increase vehicle crashworthiness, crash
avoidance, crash compatibility, and driver safety that
have no bearing on fuel economy. It is entirely possible
to build a safe motor vehicle that sips fuel—here’s how.
Fuel Economy Technologies
Several technologies are readily available to increase
fuel economy with no effect on safety: lower rolling
resistance tires; smoother, lower body with redesigned
mirrors for better aerodynamics; more efficient acces-
sories such as electric power steering; integrated
starter-generator; 7+ speed automatic-manual trans-
mission; camless valve actuation, low-friction lubri-
cants; variable valve timing and lift control; and gaso-
line direct-injection engines with lean burn and tur-
bocharging, and other options (NRC 2002; UCS
2003). 
Switching to diesel fuel may be another future option
for improving fuel economy without impacting safety.
Efficient diesel engines can boost fuel economy by
about 20 percent or potentially much more. Clean
diesel fuel and advanced diesel engines equipped with
effective after-treatment devices could deliver addi-
tional fuel economy benefits without exacerbating
public health risks through increased air
toxic emissions.  
Hybrid-electric drive vehicles (HEVs) run
on electricity and gasoline and have the
potential to deliver 30 to 60 percent higher
fuel economy, without impacting vehicle
safety (German 2007). Hybrid-electric vehi-
cles (HEVs) can be configured to obtain
different objectives, such as fuel savings,
increased power, or additional auxiliary
power for electronic devices and power
tools. Some current hybrid vehicles deliver
greater fuel savings than others, while some
perform better in highway driving and oth-
ers in city driving, depending on the type of
hybrid system employed. Toyota’s hybrid,
Prius, gets an estimated 48/45 (city/high-
way) mpg, Honda’s Civic hybrid drives
40/45 miles on a gallon of gasoline, Ford’s
hybrid Escape 4WD reports 28/27 mpg,
and the Saturn Vue gets 27/32 mpg (US EPA and US
DOE 2007). 
Safety Technologies
Similarly, there are many safety technologies that will
not affect fuel economy such as side curtain air bags;
front and rear crumple zones; electronic stability con-
trol; lower bumpers; rollover-activated belt pretension-
ers on all seats; stronger roof; and electronic seat-belt
reminders on all seats (UCS 2006).  
The fatality rate in rollovers in new SUVs has been cut
in half over the past six years (see figure below). This
decline can be attributed to manufacturers reducing
the center of gravity and increasing the track width in
newer SUV models, particularly the car-based
“crossover” SUVs, making them more stable. This
illustrates quite dramatically how vehicle design affects
fatality rates in new vehicles over time. 
When it comes to multi-vehicle crashes, vehicle safety
does not only entail how well designed your vehicle is;
it also depends on the compatibility between vehicles
in the event of an accident. Differences in vehicle
structural geometry may translate into one vehicle
intruding into the compartment of another. Likewise,
stiffer vehicles will crush less-than-softer vehicles,
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Three-Year-Old Vehicles, By Year and Vehicle Type 
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which can increase intrusion into the occupant com-
partment of the softer vehicle. And relative vehicle
weights can mean that the lighter vehicle has higher
crash energy absorption. This makes design configura-
tion and geometry of vital importance in building a
safer vehicle. 
Crashworthiness is enhanced when occupant decelera-
tion is minimized and occupants are adequately pro-
tected in the vehicle itself. Achieving this translates
into ample space for the vehicle to crush and absorb
the energy transferred in a crash, as well as the strength
and rigidity to prevent intrusion into the vehicle in an
accident. The more cushioned and protected the occu-
pants are, the better safeguarded they are. Research
has shown that reductions in curb weight would
decrease fatalities, while reductions in wheelbase
would increase fatalities, in both one-and two-vehicle
crashes (Van Auken and Zellner 2005b).
The passive safety of smaller vehicles depends largely
on the vehicle’s structural design and the specific mate-
rials used. And while smaller (and lighter) vehicles
have less “crush” space to absorb deceleration energy
in a crash, they typically have a shorter braking dis-
tance and may have better pre-crash dynamics to avoid
collisions altogether 4 (German 2006).  
To further improve the safety of vehicles without com-
promising fuel economy, manufacturers can develop
stronger vehicle compartments. The proportion of
high-strength materials can be increased for greater
overall integrity in crashes without increasing overall
weight. In order to reduce any given vehicle’s aggressiv-
ity to other vehicles, stronger structure should be com-
pensated for by greater vehicle crush outside the pas-
senger compartment. Optimized designs (with simula-
tion) and material innovations make it possible to bal-
ance the need for improved performance with the
need for weight control (German 2006).
Auto manufacturers have been improving vehicle safe-
ty on the margin for decades. Some have been more
innovative than others. For example, Ford first intro-
duced seat belt reminders and developed roll-stablity
control (Prasad 2007). And as of 2005, Honda’s vehi-
cles had vehicle stability assist on light-duty trucks (82
percent), side curtain air bags (60 percent), side-sup-
plemental restraint system air bags (78 percent), and
automated braking systems (85 percent) (German
2006). In 2006, the Honda Civic added telescoping
steering wheels (to prevent driver impact injury), high-
strength steel in about 50 percent of its body, ACE
(Advanced Compatibility Engineering) body struc-
ture, and greater rigidity for improved handling.
Manufacturers are now installing electronic stability
control; in the 2004 model year, 11 percent of cars and
13 percent of SUVs had ESC as standard equipment,
while another 3 percent of cars and 13 percent of
SUVs had it as an option (IIHS 2007). In 2007,
NHTSA passed a rule requiring ESC be installed on all
passenger vehicles (up to 10,000 pounds) which will be
phased in between 2008 and 2011 (CFR 2007).
Vehicle Weight
In addition to these technologies to independently
increase fuel economy and safety, reductions in vehicle
weight, coupled with improved design, could simulta-
neously increase both fuel economy and safety.  For
example, the softer and lighter uni-body design in pas-
senger cars has distinct safety advantages over the
stiffer and heavier body-on-frame designs typically
used in light-duty trucks.  Early “crossover” SUV
models, using uni-body design, have lower risks, both
to their own drivers and to drivers of other vehicles,
than conventional truck-based SUV models (Wenzel
and Ross, 2005).  
In the 2005 model year, half of SUVs were crossovers
(car-based SUV models) with uni-body design. And
Honda’s Ridgeline pickup truck also utilizes uni-body
design.  Strong, lightweight materials, such as alu-
minum, magnesium, light steels, and carbon compos-
ites, offer options to better optimize energy manage-
ment and mass for all vehicles. Using a systems
approach, where vehicles are designed to take full
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4 The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) finds that smaller, lighter vehicles are involved in more crashes. This is based on
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however, that the higher losses are because smaller cars are involved in more crashes, or because the damage to smaller cars is greater,
and therefore more costly.  (Nevertheless, IIHS believes that there is ample opportunity to improve fuel economy without harming
the occupant protection characteristics of vehicles.) 
advantage of these new materials, can revolutionize
vehicle safety and fuel economy simultaneously.
Vehicle mass (or weight) is an undisputed factor in
vehicle fuel economy. To illustrate the dependence,
consider that a mass reduction of 10 percent, coupled
with a reduction in engine size, can increase fuel econ-
omy by 8 percent (An, Friedman, and Ross 2002). It’s
the quick and easy fix that automakers hastily turned
to following the 1970s’ oil crises to readily transform
their bulky gas-guzzlers into “overnight” gas-sippers.
The major problem was that these vehicles were poor-
ly designed. While a reduction in vehicle mass is one
important technique for improving fuel economy, it is
certainly not the only, or even the most effective, one.
Many experts believe that weight reduction is not the
priority issue for increasing fuel economy as we move
forward, at least in the short term (Greene 2006).
In another illustrative exercise, researchers concluded
that the safety effect of a 100-pound weight reduction
would vary widely with crash type, increasing fatalities
in some types of crashes and reducing them in others.
For example, reducing the weight of the heaviest light
trucks was predicted to reduce fatalities in certain
types of crashes (between heavy trucks and other cars
and light trucks) (Kahane 2003). 
Additional opportunities remain to safely achieve
reduction in vehicle mass.  Automakers can:
• Design optimal components and local struc-
tures to reduce mass.
• Change the basic vehicle structure of conven-
tional body-on-frame SUVs and pickups by
using car-based uni-body design (as in the
“crossover SUVs” and in the Honda Ridgeline
pickup truck).
• Adopt lighter propulsion components, espe-
cially small engines capable of switching to
high power by operating at high speed or with
turbocharging, to maintain drivability and
maximum consumer appeal (Shahed 2006).
• Use simpler and lighter transmissions, such as
automatic “manual” or double-clutch tech-
nologies or continuously variable transmis-
sions.
• Continue to increase the content of light-
weight materials, such as high-strength steels
supported by advanced steel forming, light
metals (aluminum and magnesium), and fiber-
reinforced plastics (DeCicco 2005; Lovins et al.
2005).
If automakers pursue this strategy, vehicle weight
reduction should be accompanied by compatible
design elements to overcome the intrinsic property
whereby in a collision with another vehicle or roadside
object, the lighter of the pair is more strongly deceler-
ated. Depending on the details of the crash, the
stronger deceleration may create a greater risk to the
occupants in a lighter vehicle. But this additional risk
is relatively small compared to what frequently hap-
pens in a serious crash—intrusion into the passenger
compartment; vehicle rollover; or failure of the
restraints to keep occupants away from contact with
hard interior surfaces (Ross, Patel, and Wenzel 2006).  
Technology Costs
The National Academy of Sciences’ report on CAFE
standards indicated that for passenger cars, weight-
neutral fuel economy increases of from 12 percent for
subcompacts to 27 percent for large cars would be cost
effective, while for light trucks, greater improvements
were achievable at marginal costs equal to the margin-
al value of fuel saved (from 25 percent for small SUVs
to 42 percent for large SUVs) (NRC 2002). 
The NAS study was completed before the increase in
gasoline prices in the past few years. David Greene
updated the NAS results using more current gasoline
prices. In June 2006, Greene found that, assuming a
gas price of $2.50 per gallon, fuel economy could be
increased 41 percent, with net consumer savings of
$2,338. Assuming a gas price of $3.55 per gallon, fuel
economy could be increased 57 percent, with a net
consumer saving of $3,190.
In their report, Building a Better SUV, the Union of
Concerned Scientists estimates that a boost in SUV
fuel economy to 36.3 miles per gallon, coupled with
new safety features and weight reduction, could save
2,900 lives annually at a total cost of under $3,000 per
vehicle. The lifetime fuel cost savings is about $4,400,
with a projected payback of about three years.
However, if the price of gasoline increases over $2.50 a
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gallon, the payback from gasoline savings becomes
even more favorable (UCS 2006). 
Select vehicles with short payback times are already
available on showroom floors today. Consumer 
Reports (2006) found that at least two current hybrid
vehicle models recovered their price premium in the
first five years and 75,000 miles of ownership. Hybrid
Toyota Prius owners save $406, and Honda Civic
Hybrid owners save $317, compared to the Toyota
Corolla LE sedan and the Honda Civic EX sedan,
respectively. The economic savings of these models are
even greater if one factors in federal (and state, if avail-
able) tax credits.  (It is rumored, however, that Toyota
and Honda are subsidizing the added up-front cost of
these hybrid models.)  Future hybrid models could
have even faster payback times if they do not trade off
fuel economy for greater power.
In terms of the costs of safety improvements, NHTSA
estimated that over 300,000 lives had been saved by
vehicle safety technologies since 1960, and govern-
ment-mandated safety standards had added about
$840 in vehicle costs. NHTSA’s cost-effectiveness cal-
culations examined past braking improvements, safety
belts, air bags, energy-absorbing steering columns,
child safety seats, improved roof strength and side
impact protection, shatter-resistant windshields, and
instrument panel upgrades. As of 2005, the agency had
not evaluated newer technologies such as side air bags,
electronic stability control systems, lightweight materi-
als, or a host of other promising vehicle safety tech-
nologies (TRB 2005). NHTSA is currently evaluating
newer safety technologies; this should include the
many safety technology and policy advances that result
in lower fatality rates in other nations.
Researchers abroad have concluded that several other
vehicle safety technologies (some of which were devel-
oped by U.S. automakers) are cost effective, including
seatbelt reminders, accident data recorders, electronic
stability control, improved blind spot mirrors, intelli-
gent speed adaptation, alcohol ignition interlocks, con-
spicuous vehicle marking, under-run protection, day-
time running lights, and lane departure warnings
(Odgaard and Bogelund 2007).
Research Findings on Vehicle
Fuel Economy and Safety 
The workshop that informed this report considered
the most recent evidence on fuel economy and safety,
including important peer reviewed studies published
since the National Research Council (NAS) 2002
report on fuel economy standards. A wide array of
automotive analysts have concluded that there are
many ways to sip fuel while saving lives. (see Appendix
A for list of participants). The key technical findings
that should guide future policy design are:
1.  Most technologies to increase fuel economy do not
affect safety; most technologies to increase safety do
not affect fuel economy.
2.  There are many technological options for increasing
vehicle fuel economy; reducing weight via material
substitution is but one of many available strategies.
3.  Strategically reducing car weight while improving
vehicle structure, using advanced materials and
designs, can simultaneously increase fuel economy
and safety.
4.  Reducing the weight of heavier SUVs and pickup
trucks increases fuel economy and improves the
safety of all vehicles on the road.
Different researchers who participated in the work-
shop have their own specific findings that relate to
vehicle safety and fuel economy. Each draws important
conclusions that can be used to enlighten future poli-
cymaking efforts (see Appendix B).
Challenges and Barriers
Experts remind us that vehicle design is crucial, but
there are other confounding factors in the safety/fuel
economy equation; road hazards, driving errors, and
the driving environment present distinct challenges.
Examples abound: Aggressive driving reduces safety
and fuel economy. Poorly maintained vehicles reduce
fuel economy and safety. Poorly designed rural roads
reduce safety and can affect fuel economy under less-
than-ideal driving conditions. Poor driving skills
reduce safety and fuel economy. And speeding (along
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with higher speed limits) reduces safety and fuel econ-
omy. Moreover, safety testing and models developed
have limitations. Consumer information programs are
limited by funding and other factors. Long lead times
can delay goals. And consumers face trade-offs
between vehicle performance and broader social goals
when making purchase decisions. While these factors
raise certain challenges, they should not be an excuse
for inaction. Policy designs should reduce barriers and
compensate for trade-offs, whenever possible.
Safety Testing Limitations
Crash tests cannot replicate real-world crashes—espe-
cially in side impacts. The inexact science and imper-
fect regime of testing vehicles may not always yield the
best solutions. This can result in unintended conse-
quences. For example, left side crashes are worse than
frontal crashes possibly due to a testing regime that has
historically focused on front-end collision testing.
Manufacturers’ design changes made to improve
frontal crash-test scores resulted in producing vehicles
(especially pickups and SUVs) that are more aggres-
sively designed than they need to be (especially in side
impacts with other vehicles).  
Crash tests do not reflect real-world vehicle compati-
bility. Analysts have historically considered only the
risk to occupants of the vehicle in question. In a larger
social context, all those on the road, including the
occupants in other vehicles, deserve to be protected. A
carefully designed program of two-vehicle crash tests
(that measure the aggressivity of car vs. SUV or pickup
collisions) merits introduction. 
Crash tests focus on crashworthiness, not crash avoid-
ance. Heavier vehicles tend to have longer stopping
distances and reduced maneuverability compared to
lighter vehicles. As an important element in vehicle
safety, crash avoidance merits greater consideration in
new testing regimes. 
Model Limitations
The limits of models used to determine the feasibility
and cost effectiveness of fuel economy and safety
improvements can create unnecessary barriers for
future regulations. New technologies can introduce
uncertainties in models. Accurate estimates of the
costs of material substitution and weight reduction, for
example, could make current models more useful in
terms of policy design and assessment. Continuously
updating models with up-to-date technology informa-
tion requires resources allocated to these purposes.
Consumer Information Limitations 
Limits to the vehicle safety testing regime can further
confuse consumers. As vehicle manufacturers strive to
improve the designs of their new vehicles to ensure
that they do not receive low safety scores, they can
steer away from better designs. But the injury risks in
actual driving only weakly correlate with crash test
results (Newstead, Farmer, Narayan, and Cameron
2003).  Yet to a growing number of consumers, safety
ratings form the basis for purchase decision. Vehicles
are designed to be crashworthy based on tests, not
real-world conditions. This information can confuse
consumers.
Opportunities for Moving
Forward—Sipping Fuel 
and Saving Lives
In 2004, the fuel economy of the average new passen-
ger vehicle dropped to its lowest point since 1980, and
in 2005, highway fatalities reached their highest level
since 1990. The question remains whether the next
decade and beyond will continue these troublesome
trends. The future designs of U.S. cars, SUVs, and
light trucks will be influenced by public policies, or the
lack thereof. Thousands of lives, millions of injuries,
billions of gallons of gasoline, millions of tons of car-
bon, and billions of U.S. consumer dollars each year
hang in the balance. Congress is now considering new
policies to increase the fuel economy of new automo-
biles in order to address many national concerns.
If the overarching goal is to pursue both safety and fuel
economy, then vehicle design is the key. Manufacturers
can make tremendous strides with technologies, and
consumers can make better purchase decisions if they
have complete information on a large selection of safe,
high fuel economy vehicle models. There are numer-
ous opportunities available to improve vehicle safety,
including electronic stability control to reduce vehicle
rollovers; stronger roofs and pillars to improve crash-
worthiness in rollovers; compatible frontal heights to
reduce truck-car fatalities and injuries; side curtain air
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bags to protect occupants in side crashes; improved
seatbelt technology to protect occupants in all crashes;
and many other designs and technologies.
Technologies also exist to improve fuel economy: 7
speed automatic-manual transmissions; integrated
starter-generators; low-friction lubricants; electronic
variable valve and lift control; lean burn gasoline
direct-injection engines with turbocharging; low
rolling resistance tires; bodies with better aerodynam-
ics; and more efficient accessories.  In addition, use of
new lightweight materials to reduce weight while
maintaining size will increase fuel economy without
affecting safety.
In addition to these technologies, there are several pol-
icy strategies to further improve fuel economy and
safety: 
• Set fuel economy and safety performance goals
at cost-effective levels, and allow adequate time
for phase-in of vehicle redesigns.
• Develop near-term goals that use existing tech-
nological potential and long-term goals to spur
continued innovation. 
• Apply the same fuel economy and safety stan-
dards consistently to all vehicle types (cars,
SUVs, and pickup trucks).
• Encourage modification in driver behavior
(speed limits, seatbelt use, drunk driving laws,
etc.) to improve fuel economy or safety.
These strategies would usher in a new fleet of higher
fuel economy, safer passenger vehicles.
Well-designed targets mean that industry can put its
genius to work to meet these goals.
The overarching question is: what are our national pri-
orities? The compounded costs of vehicles that sip fuel
and save lives are high—lost lives, unnecessary injuries,
incurred medical expenses, reduced productivity, com-
promised national security, increased funding for
national defense, resource skirmishes and wars, trade
deficits, air pollution, and a host of dire impacts from
climate change. Vehicles have long lifetimes. The autos
produced today will eventually be driven by our chil-
dren. Fuel economy can be dramatically improved
without compromising safety. Safety can be bolstered
without sacrificing fuel economy. Now is the time to
deliver a new generation of safer, higher-fuel-economy
vehicles for the next generation of Americans.
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Participants at the October 4, 2006 Hewlett Foundation Vehicle Safety and Fuel Economy Meeting
Appendix A
List of Expert Attendees and Affiliation
First Name Last Name Title Organization 
Mike Brylawski Senior Consultant Rocky Mountain Institute
Joan Claybrook President Public Citizen
Dainius Dalmotas Consultant D.J. Dalmotas Consulting
Danielle Deane Program Officer, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Environment
John DeCicco Senior Fellow, Environmental Defense
Automotive Strategies
Ken Digges Director of Biomechanics National Crash Analysis Center
and Automotive The George Washington University
Safety Research
Clarence Ditlow Executive Director Center for Auto Safety
Michael Freedhoff Senior Policy Associate Office of Representative 
Edward J. Markey (D-MA)
David Friedman Research Director, Union of Concerned Scientists
Clean Vehicles Program
John German Manager, Environmental American Honda Motor Co.
and Energy Analysis
David Greene Senior Research Staff Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Member, Center for 
Transportation Analysis
Hal Harvey Program Director, The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Environment
Eric Haxthausen Economist Environmental Defense
Ralph Hitchcock Consultant American Honda Motor Co.
Yoshiji Kadotani Chief Engineer American Honda Motor Co.
Robert Kaeser Professor, Department of  Zürich University of Applied Sciences
Technology, Computer 
Science, and Natural Sciences
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First Name Last Name Title Organization 
Deron Lovaas Vehicles Campaign Director Natural Resources Defense Council
and Deputy Director of the 
Smart Growth and  
TransportationProgram
Amory Lovins Chief Executive Officer Rocky Mountain Institute
Adrian Lund President Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
Laura MacCleery Congress Watch Director Public Citizen
Carl Nash Adjunct Professor of National Crash Analysis Center
Engineering The George Washington University
Bob Noland Reader (Associate Professor) Imperial College London .
in Transport and 
Environmental Policy
Franklin Nutter President Reinsurance Association of America
Deena Patel Postdoctoral Fellow Physics Department, 
University of Michigan
Jason Patlis Deputy Chief of Staff, House Committee On Science
Majority Staff
David Pittle Consultant
Priya Prasad Ford Technical Fellow, Ford Research and Innovation Center
Safety Research and 
Development
Marc Ross Professor Emeritus University of Michigan
Physics Department
Joe Ryan Managing Director for The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
Latin America and Program 
Officer, Environment
Steven Schmidt Research Administrator, State Farm Insurance Co.
Automotive Technical 
Research Unit
Robert Shull Deputy Director for Public Citizen
Auto Safety & Regulatory 
Policy
David Snyder Vice President and American Insurance Association
Assistant General Counsel
First Name Last Name Title Organization 
Todd Summe Market Development Alcoa, Inc.
Manager
Stephen Summers Staff Engineer National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration
Mike Van Auken Principal Engineer Dynamic Research, Inc.
William Walsh Consultant
John Waters Team Leader, Rocky Mountain Institute
Breakthrough Design Team
Tom Wenzel Scientist Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
Blake Zuidema Director, Product Mittal Steel Company - USA R&D Center
Applications Division
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Tom Wenzel (Lawrence Berkeley National Labora-
tory) and Marc Ross (University of Michigan), in their
briefing paper, “Increasing the Fuel Economy and
Safety of New Light-Duty Vehicles,” find that vehicle
design is the key. New safety technologies and light-
weight materials will decouple any historical relation-
ship among weight, size, and safety. Vehicle weight and
size provide only partial protection; they don’t help in
side crashes, and they have little effect on the propen-
sity to roll over. Heavier and larger trucks and SUVs
are very unsafe—they kill other drivers. These vehicles
are much more aggressive toward other vehicles than
are lighter and smaller vehicles. And their aggressivity
increases as their size/weight increases. Therefore,
reducing frontal height and stiffness is necessary to
reduce larger truck/SUV aggressivity, and increasing
frontal height, side stiffness and crush space in cars is
necessary to improving their relative safety on the road
with large trucks. Compact pickups are more aggres-
sive than large cars of comparable mass, and compact
truck-based SUVs are more aggressive than midsize
cars of comparable mass. Finally, crossover SUVs are
safer and more efficient than truck-based SUVs (17
percent higher fuel economy for same interior volume;
lower overall safety risks with lower fronts and uni-
body design).
David Greene from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, in
his policy briefing paper, “Fuel Economy Policies and
Highway Safety,” makes several important assertions.
It is not fuel economy per se that affects vehicle safe-
ty—no one asserts that the amount of fuel a vehicle
consumes has a direct effect on safety. The relationship
between fuel economy and highway safety is complex,
ambiguous, poorly understood, and not measurable by
any known means at the present time (NRC 2002). In
fact, there is evidence supporting the current view that
there has been no relationship between fuel economy
and traffic fatalities. Generally ignored is the fact that
engine size and horsepower affect fuel economy—
reducing engine size and power are also options open
to manufacturers to increase fuel economy. If all vehi-
cles’ weights are reduced by an equal percentage, there
would be no effect on safety. Thus, the key intuitive
argument for a link from fuel economy to vehicle
weight to safety is actually not applicable to a fleet-
wide reduction in weight. Recently published statisti-
cal analysis of the correlation between fuel economy
and traffic fatalities, covering the period from 1966 to
2002, have either produced inconclusive results using
state-level data (Noland 2004) or have conclusively
demonstrated that there was no such correlation at the
national level (Ahmad and Greene 2005). The bottom
line: significant technological options are available to
manufacturers with which greenhouse gas emissions
can be reduced and fuel economy improved without
affecting vehicle size or weight.
Amory Lovins and his team from the Rocky Mountain
Institute, in their book, Winning the Oil Endgame,
believe that the key to the next vehicle efficiency
breakthrough will be ultra-light materials now entering
the market. Taking as much as another ton out of our
vehicles was long assumed to be unsafe and unafford-
able. Today, light-weighting needn’t be either, thanks
to advances in both metals and plastics. Extra-strong
steel alloys and innovative structures could double
automotive fuel economy and improve safety at no
extra cost. BMW is currently developing carbon fiber
for use in series production cars because it’s 50 percent
lighter than steel and performs extremely well in vehi-
cle crash testing. And adding size without weight pro-
vides protection without hostility.
David Friedman with the Union of Concerned
Scientists, in his presentation, “Optimizing Fuel
Economy and Safety to Avoid Tradeoffs,” posits that it
is entirely possible to improve fuel economy without
impacting safety because many fuel economy technolo-
gies are out there with no obvious safety drawbacks.
Likewise, it is possible to improve safety without
impacting fuel economy because there are many safety
approaches with no major fuel economy drawbacks.
Thus fuel economy and safety can move forward on
parallel tracks. Vehicle weight increases required for
safety improvements do not have significant impacts
on fuel economy. Finding a comfortable fit between
fuel economy and safety means choosing technologies
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wisely. Lower center of gravity both reduces rollovers
and improves car/truck compatibility while reducing
aerodynamic drag. Material substitution and system
redesigns enhance safety while reducing weight. The
key is to avoid unnecessary trade-offs between vehicle
safety and fuel economy; both are worthy national pri-
orities.
John German, the Manager of Environmental and
Energy Analysis at American Honda Motor Company,
in his presentation, “Improving Safety Without
Impacting Fuel Economy,” claims that today’s
advances in crash technology and materials require a
more sophisticated analysis to analyze separately the
effect of size and weight on safety.
But overall, a reduction in light-truck weights decreas-
es fatalities, while light-truck wheelbase and/or track
reduction increases fatalities. Not just Honda, but all
manufacturers are working to improve the compatibil-
ity of their vehicles on the road to increase occupant
safety. While advanced crash safety technology and
crash avoidance technology will not change any under-
lying relationship between safety and size/weight nor
fully account for driver behavior, these technologies
will reduce the overall safety impact by reducing the
magnitude of all injuries sustained. And, finally and
most important, the technologies Honda is developing
will improve the situation considerably—lightweight
materials can both reduce overall fatalities and improve
fuel economy.
Adrian Lund, with the Insurance Institute of Highway
Safety (IIHS), in his PowerPoint presentation at the
workshop, “Reflecting Vehicle Safety in Insurance
Costs,” identifies the insurance coverage variables that
enable IIHS data collection of the costs associated
with accidents. In IIHS’s data set, which focuses on the
private questions of loss rather than on larger social
concerns of vehicle safety, IIHS finds that small cars
incur greater insurance losses than larger cars, but the
largest 4WD SUVs incur similar or even greater losses
than smaller SUVs. Heavier pickup trucks, SUVs,
sports cars, and luxury cars have greater relative bodi-
ly injury liability outlays overall than their lighter coun-
terparts. The inverse is true of non-luxury, non-sport
car models. IIHS acknowledges that vehicle fuel econ-
omy can be increased without affecting safety, and
safety can be increased without affecting vehicle fuel
economy. However, auto safety improvements can
have different effects on different insurance coverage.
The ability of IIHS to evaluate the effect of vehicle
safety improvements, such as head restraints with bet-
ter geometry, on injury claims is limited because IIHS
can only evaluate injury insurance losses in no-fault
states where a driver’s own insurance covers his or her
injury expenses. Injuries related to whiplash are the
single largest source of injury claims—24 percent of all
injury losses.  Fatality insurance claims are less costly
than serious injury claims, which can entail long-term
hospitalization, expensive surgeries, loss of earning
potential, etc. In sum, IIHS believes that there is ample
opportunity to improve fuel economy without harming
the occupant protection characteristics of vehicles.
Adrian Lund (IIHS), in his PowerPoint presentation
at the workshop, “CAFE and Motor Vehicle Safety:
Policy Makes a Difference,” concludes that past
improvements in fuel economy have cost lives, but that
improvements in fuel economy in the future are possi-
ble without harming safety through the use of technol-
ogy. IIHS analyzed occupant death rates by vehicle
type and weight, and found that car and pickup occu-
pant death rates decrease as weight increases, while
other vehicle death rates increase as pickup and SUV
weight increases.  IIHS concludes that despite huge
improvements in vehicle safety, the effects of car size
and weight still exist. In its referenced report, “Faster
Travel and the Price We Pay,” IIHS states that
improvements in fuel economy are possible without
harming safety. The link is new fuel-efficiency tech-
nologies. Other opportunities beyond vehicle tech-
nologies also exist to reduce fuel use and improve safe-
ty, including lowering speed limits and replacing signal
lights with roundabouts/traffic circles. For two
decades automakers have been pumping up the per-
formance capabilities of new cars. From 1980 to 2002,
the average horsepower-to-weight ratio—a key meas-
ure of performance—increased by 50 percent. (IIHS
2003). Even the Toyota Camry is hyped for perform-
ance. In a commercial for the Camry, a driver goes
backward, jumps hilltops, and swerves across four
lanes. The tagline: “My car makes me feel like the road
is my playground.” Less safety and more gas 
guzzling are the prices we pay for today’s “muscle”
cars (IIHS 2003).
S I P P I N G  F U E L  A N D  S AV I N G  L I V E S  /  2 2
Workshop Materials Available Online:
www.theicct.org 
www.hewlett.org 
S I P P I N G  F U E L  A N D  S AV I N G  L I V E S  /  2 3
References
Ahmad, S., and Greene, D.L. 2005. Effect of fuel economy on automobile safety: A reexamination. 
Transportation Research Record 1941. Washington, DC: Transportation Research Board of the 
National Academies. 
An, F., Friedman, D., and Ross, M. 2002. Near-term fuel economy potential for light-duty trucks. SAE 
Technical Paper Series 2002-01-1900. Warrendale, PA.
Arbelaez, R.A., Baker, B.C., and Nolan, J.M. 2005. Delta Vs for IIHS side impact crash tests and 
their relationship to real-world crash severity. Proceedings of the 19th International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, paper number 05-0049. Available at
www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-01/esv/19th/esv19.htm
Ball, Jeffrey. 2003. Ford delays plans to boost fuel economy of its SUVs. Wall St. Journal, April 18.
Center for Auto Safety (CAS). 2006. “Consumers can save money and oil without sacrificing choice.” 
Washington, DC, February 27.
Cloud, John. 2003. Why the SUV is all the rage. Time, February 16.
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). 2007. “Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Electronic Stability 
Control Systems; Controls and Displays.” 72 Fed. Reg. 17,236, April 6.
Consumer Reports. 2006. The dollars & sense of hybrids. April.
Davis, Stacy. 2006. Transportation energy databook: Edition 24, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Table 1.8.
DeCicco, J. 2005. Steel and iron technologies for automotive lightweighting.” New York: 
Environmental Defense.
Edwards, M., Happian-Smith, J., Davies, H., Byard, N., and Hobbs, A. 2001.  The essential requirements
for compatible cars in frontal collisions.  Proceedings of the 17th International Technical 
Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, paper number 158. Available at 
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-01/Esv/esv17/Proceed/search.pdf 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2006. International Energy Annual 2004.
EIA. 2007a. Basic Petroleum Statistics, March.
EIA. 2007b. Petroleum Navigator.
Evans, L. 2001. Causal influence of car mass and size on driver fatality  risk. American Journal of 
Public Health, 91(7), 1076–1081.
Evans, L. 2004. How to make a car lighter and safer. Paper No. 2004-01-1172. Warrendale, PA:  
Society of Automotive Engineers.
Faerber, E. 2001.  EEVC research in the field of improvement of crash compatibility between passenger cars.
Proceedings of the 17th International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehicles, 
paper number 444. 
Available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd01/Esv/esv17/Proceed/search.pdf
Ford, H., with S. Crowther. 1922. My Life and Work. Kessinger Publishing (republished January 2003), 53.
German, J. 2006, Improving safety without impacting fuel economy. Honda Motor Company, October 4.
S I P P I N G  F U E L  A N D  S AV I N G  L I V E S  /  2 4
German, J. 2007. Email Correspondence, May 18.
Greene, D.L. 2004. Why don’t we just tax gasoline? Why we don’t just tax gasoline. IAEE/USAEE Meetings, 
Washington, DC, July 10.
Greene, D.L. 2006. Fuel economy policy and highway safety. Report prepared for the Hewlett Foundation, 
September 24.
Heavenrich, R. 2006. Light-duty automotive technology and fuel economy trends: 1975 through 2006.
EPA420-R-06-011.  Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS). 2003. Faster travel and the price we pay. 
Status Report, 38(19), November 10.
Insurance Institute of Highway Safety (IIHS). 2007. Available at http://www.iihs.org/ratings/esc/esc.aspx
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2001. Key findings of working group II, February 19.
Jackson, James K. 2006. US trade deficit and the impact of rising oil prices. Congressional Research Service, 
November 14.
Kahane, C.J. 1997. Relationships between vehicle size and fatality risk in model year 1985–93 
passenger cars and light trucks. NHTSA DOT HS 808 570. Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.
Kahane, C.J. 2003. Vehicle weight, fatality risk and crash compatibility of model year 1991–99 
passenger cars and light trucks. NHTSA DOT HS 809 662. Washington, DC: National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation.
Kahane, C.J., 2004. Response to docket comments on NHTSA technical report “Vehicle weight, fatality risk 
and crash compatibility of model year 1991–99 passenger cars and light trucks.” Submission to
docket no.NHTSA-2003-16318. Washington, DC: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
U.S. Department of Transportation.
Kebschull, S., et al. 2004. An analysis of the effects of SUV weight and length on SUV crashworthiness and 
compatibility using systems modelling and risk-benefit analysis. DRI-TR-04-04-2, US DOT Docket 
NHTSA-2003-16128-1452. Torrance, CA: Dynamic Research, Inc., July.
Lovins, A.B., Data, E.K., Bustnes, O.E., Koomey, J.G., and Glasgow, N.J. 2005. Winning the oil endgame. 
Snowmass, CO: Rocky Mountain Institute, 57–61.
Nash, Carl E. 2006. A market approach to motor vehicle safety . . . that also addresses tort reform. Product 
Safety & Liability Reporter, 34(8), 206–212. 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 2005. Motor vehicle crash data from FARS and 
GES, 2006.
National Research Council (NRC). 2002. Effectiveness and impact of corporate average fuel economy standards.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press.
Newstead, S.V., Farmer, C.M., Narayan, S., and Cameron, M.H. 2003. US consumer crash test results and 
injury risk in policy-reported crashes. Traffic Injury Prevention, 4, 113–127.
Noland, R.B. 2004. Motor vehicle fuel efficiency and traffic fatalities. Energy Journal, 25(4).
Odgaard, Thomas, and Bogelund, Mette. 2007. Cost-benefit assessment and prioritization of vehicle safety 
technologies. Norway: Department for Economics and Financial Analysis, COWI, Trafikdage pa 
Aalborg Universitet, January 30.
S I P P I N G  F U E L  A N D  S AV I N G  L I V E S  /  2 5
O’Neill, B. 1998. The physics of car crashes and the role of vehicle size and weight in occupant protection. 
Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation: State of the Art Reviews, 12(1). Philadelphia, PA: Hanley & 
Belfus, Inc.
O’Neill, B., Joksch, H., and Haddon, W. 1974. Empirical relationships between car size, car weight and crash 
injuries in car-to-car crashes. Proceedings of the 5th International Technical Conference on 
Experimental Safety Vehicles, London, June 4–7, 362–368.
Patel, D., Ross, M., Compton, C., and Wenzel, T. 2006. Intrusion and the aggressivity of light duty trucks in 
side impact crashes.  Presentation at 2nd International Expert Symposium on Accident Research, 
Hanover, Germany, September 1–2. 
Prasad, P., 2007. Email Correspondence, May 31.
Ross, Marc, Patel, Deena, and Wenzel, Tom. 2006. Vehicle design and the physics of traffic safety. Physics 
Today, 59, 49–54.
Runge, Jeffrey. 2003. North American International Auto Show, Michigan, January.
Shahed, S.M. 2006. An analysis of assisted turbocharging with light hybrid powertrain. SAE Technical 
Paper Series, 2006-01-0019. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD). 2000. Multiple air toxics exposure study in the 
South Coast Air Basin (MATES II), March.
Transportation Research Board (TRB). 2005. Lives saved by the federal motor vehicle safety standards and 
other vehicle safety technologies, 1960–2002. Washington, DC, January 25.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) and U.S. Department of Energy (US DOE). 2007. 
2007 fuel economy guide. Available at www.fueleconomy.gov
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). 2003. Building a better SUV: A blueprint for saving lives, money, and 
gasoline, September.
Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). 2006. Optimizing fuel economy and safety to avoid tradeoffs. Hewlett 
Foundation Workshop, October 4.
Van Auken, R.M., and Zellner, J.W. 2005a.  An assessment of the effects of vehicle weight and size on fatality 
risk in 1985 to 1998 model year passenger cars and 1985 to 1997 model year light trucks and vans. SAE
Technical Paper Series, 2005-01-1354. Warrendale, PA: Society of Automotive Engineers.
Van Auken, R.M., and Zellner, J.W. 2005b. Supplemental results on the independent effects of curb weight, 
wheelbase, and track on fatality risk in 1985–1998 model year passenger cars and 1985–1997 model 
year LTVs. DRI-TR-05-01. U.S. DOT  Docket NHTSA-2003-16318-17. Torrance, CA: Dynamic 
Research, Inc., May.
Wenzel, T.P., and Ross, M. 2005. The effects of vehicle model and driver behavior on risk.” Accident Analysis 
and Prevention, 37, 479–494.
Wenzel, T.P, and Ross, M. 2006. Increasing the fuel economy and safety of new light-duty vehicles. Paper 
presented at the Hewlett Foundation’s Workshop, “Simultaneously Improving Vehicle Safety and 
Fuel Economy Through Improvements in Vehicle Design and Materials, Washington, DC, October 4.
S I P P I N G  F U E L  A N D  S AV I N G  L I V E S  /  2 6
Report design: Elizabeth DiPalma Design
The International Council on Clean Transportation
1250 I St., Suite 350
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 347-8932
http://www.theicct.org/
The William and Flora Hewlett Foundation
2121 Sand Hill Road
Menlo Park, CA 94025
(650) 234-4500
http://www.hewlett.org
